Jochen Gimmel, Zeit haben – Zeit sein – Ein Plädoyer für Zeit (2023) –

Jochen Gimmel’s monograph appears in a study series on the theory and cultural history of leisure, published by a Freiburg-based Collaborative Research Centre. Written within the ivory tower, it is evidently not destined to ever leave it. This is regrettable, for the author develops unconventional approaches to a theory of time – approaches which, due to his constant reliance on established authorities and the resulting academic style, are likely accessible only to a specialized professional audience and highly informed laypeople.
 
Furthermore, the reviewer cannot shake the impression that the heavy reliance on canonical theoretical positions regarding time – serving as both the starting point and justification for his own thinking – actually hinders the author in the consistent articulation of his own ideas. Consequently, while his initial premises are interesting, he ultimately remains mired in convention. A pity, really.
 
For instance, drawing upon Kant, Gimmel entangles himself in a paradoxical self-referentiality from which, in reality, nothing is gained. He speaks of a transcendental a priori of the performance of time: time is time in actu in the event and simultaneously as horizon of events temporal dimension. Concrete temporal relations constitute the horizon of events, which ostensibly ‘precedes’ them, yet – precisely because it functions as the condition for the occurrence of events – cannot, in fact, ‘precede’ them. This strategy invokes a „Münchhausen maneuver“ – the act of „pulling oneself out of the swamp by one’s own pigtail“ – which should be justified by the inherently aporetic character of the experience of time: a character that, the author insists, must be acknowledged and endured.
 
This is not particularly original. While for Kant time constitutes the condition for the possibility of knowledge, for Gimmel it transforms into the condition for the possibility of time itself. By attributing a quasi-transcendental character to time, he remains -firmly in the Kantian tradition – bound to the notion that time, even if not ‘merely’ an object of experience, is nonetheless ‘something’. This holds true despite the fact that he actually conceives of time as a characterizing expression for dynamic processes. The step of consistently regarding it simply as a linguistic label for precisely this dynamism – a label we employ as a means to an end when communicating about various concrete events.
 
In my view, his approach suffers primarily from an imprecise distinction between the concrete and the general uses of the concept of time. For, on the one hand, he discusses time as a concrete event in actu – as it unfolds – while simultaneously, on the other hand, treating time as a general horizon of events. The author does not explicitly articulate this distinction in usage and is therefore unable to resolve the aporetic character of „time“ per se. Although he emphasizes the multiplicity of asynchronous individual temporalities and their mutual confrontation within the simultaneity of perceiving a composite event, he conflates these concepts.
 
This becomes evident when he introduces the concept of the „That-of-the-Now“ – a notion central to his argument, and one again grounded in extensive recourse to the authority of a philosophical classic – to describe the reciprocal and tension-laden situatedness of events, characterized here as „intensity,“ which he essentially equates with concrete temporal experience. By employing—presumably without critical reflection, and in the Aristotelian tradition – the nominalized form of the term „now“ (an expression typically used only adverbially in everyday speech), he once again entangles himself in antinomies.
 
While the adverbial modifier „now“ can only ever be applied in relation to concrete situations, its nominalization introduces a generalization that is no longer tied to a specific situation, but rather denotes the general form of situations in which the adverbial modifier is employed. Whereas „now“ marks that which is singular and unique, „Now“ stands for a multiplicity of possible uses of „now.“ Hence the talk of many different „now-points“ – which, much like the oft-cited pearls on a string, can be strung together.
 
In a structuralist vein, every phenomenon of reality in Gimmel’s work manifests itself temporally in its own distinct manner, engaging in dynamic interrelationships with other phenomena. Within this context of interaction, the specific, distinct temporalities of each phenomenon are placed in a relationship of simultaneity. „Simultaneity is, in a sense, a coexistence of that which is – in terms of its own distinct temporality – non-simultaneous or asynchronous, understood as a relational context of interaction.“ The fundamental phenomenon is, therefore, the individual event – an occurrence that, in the very act of unfolding, delineates itself from a broader totality of events. This constitutes a motif drawn from systems theory. And thus, Gimmel traces a path from Kant – via an unnamed Ferdinand de Saussure – to Niklas Luhmann.  

What does all this have to do with leisure? After all, this is a study concerning the temporal constitution of leisure – a concept Gimmel does not interpret as „freedom from the constraints of time,“ but rather as a unique opportunity to experience time ‘as such’. In moments of leisure, the objectified temporal order of chronology is suspended; this suspension enables the individual to experience themselves – freely and unencumbered – within the full span of their own existence. As a liminal experience that interrupts the ordinary flow of time, leisure permits – with radical intensity and consistency – a lingering within a single moment (Kairos): a moment charged with the tension of yearning both backward and forward through time.
 
In times of leisure, Gimmel argues, the paradoxical tension between „having arrived“ and „being on the way“ creates an arc of tension within which the self – constantly renewing itself – finds its place within an elusive reality. In leisure, desires unfold – desires that one does not merely ‘possess’, but rather ‘enacts’ by reaching out across the expanse of time. The acts of „having time“ and „being time“ are rooted in utopian visions, wherein the unknown emerges as a realm of possibility during the journey toward self-discovery. Gimmel writes: „The elusive reality of the present – which only reveals and unfolds itself through the act of desiring – proves to be the mysterious reality of time itself.“
 
One requires a considerable amount of leisure oneself to follow the author’s intellectual acrobatics. In his exposition, he demonstrates not only how a narratively coherent, meaning-generating orientation toward time can emerge from the „temporal tumult“ of isolated events, but also how inspiring approaches to a practical understanding of time can be forged from the tumult of competing temporal theories – an understanding that ultimately serves to justify a plea for breaking free from the constraints of social time.