Time comes into play when, in the course of distinguishing and relating presence and absence, the absent is brought into focus by the present and thus becomes present. Time marks and masks the aporia of absence within presence: when the absent becomes present, it is no longer absent; the aporia lies in the fact that the absent is simultaneously present and therefore no longer absent. Time, or temporal expressions of language, „bridge“ and conceal the inherent contradiction that accompanies the merging of presence and absence into a (progressive) unity. Time itself remains an indeterminate concept; only the context-specific, concrete relations (temporalities, proper times, temporalities) of phenomena that are not simultaneously present are determined.

Time does not denote the distinction between presence and absence as such, but rather a specific form (among others) of the unity of presence and absence. The emergence or appearance of this unity is temporal, and – in the sense of the grammatical medium – is both actively pursued and experienced because the distinction, as a criterion and as a unity, is spontaneously established (i.e., experienced separately) and passively encountered (i.e., experienced together). Norbert Elias, with his verbalization of time as „zeiten“ (timing), draws attention to the (intersubjective) active aspect, while Martin Heidegger, with his verbalization of time as „zeitigen“ (being timed), focuses on the passive (encountered) aspect of the meaning-making process opened up by the temporal horizon, enabling orientation.

Literature:

formulated following the presentation of the concept of justice according to Luhmann and Derrida in the 13th lecture „GesmbH“ by Manfred Füllsack and Arno Böhler, Vienna, Summer Semester 2010

Further Reading:

Norbert Elias’s Concept of Time
Martin Heidegger’s Concept of Time
Why time at all? (Time-Subjects)

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