From a linguistic-theoretical perspective, „now“ is an adverb that functions as an organizing factor in communication, conveying a more precise temporal specification of the situatedness of the participants involved. Unlike calendrical or physical time references, „now“ is invariably tied to a specific situation of utterance, thereby expressing relations of anteriority („until now“), simultaneity („right now“), or posteriority („from now on“). In conjunction with verb tenses, this adverb can also be employed to provide a concrete retrospective, concurrent, or prospective view of past or future situations (e.g., „now was the right moment“; „now the moment will have arrived“). In other words: “now” establishes a relationship between the time of speaking and the time(s) of the event(s).

As a deictic expression used in everyday language, „now“ refers to specific circumstances and events within the immediate or broader environment of a particular communicative situation, thereby establishing their connection to the speaker or the addressee. Its primary function here is not to designate an objective state of affairs, but rather – and above all – to signal a subjective sense of involvement. In this context, „now“ can assume an appellative character (e.g., „now or never,“ „do/stop that now“) or serve to mark emotional impact („now you’ve really done it“), shared suffering („now it’s too late to change anything“), complicity („now you’re one of us“), responsibility („now the damage is done“), finality (an „end“), continuity, persistence, or a new beginning.

The adverb „now“ refers less to a calendar-based or chronological classification than to a psychological distinction between a momentary situation with its unique possibilities and other situations where these possibilities may not exist: „now“ points to the particularity of the situatedness, the associated opportunities and risks, and can thus also signify the „right“ moment for a course of action.
While the present, in contrast to the absent, is directed toward what is present, what is at hand, and thus, in principle, perceptible or conceivable, „now,“ in contrast to „not-now,“ reaches further and specifically targets what is absent, not present, which is related to the current situatedness.

Both the moment and the situatedness addressed by „now“ are flexible in duration. The moment encompasses a situation, requires a pause, and aims at awareness. The adverbial phrase interrupts an event and requires positioning as well as possibly an action. It marks an end, a beginning, or an interruption. The concrete nature of the adverbial phrase is reflected in the caesura-like character of the moment.

„Now“ does not depend on the situation; it is not attached to it attributively or affectively. On the contrary, the situation itself is fixed by the adverbial phrase. The use of the adverbial phrase effectively stamps a mark of connection onto the situation. More or less independent events are placed in a relationship of simultaneity and thus in a postulated causal relationship. At the same time, the participants in the communication are coordinated and temporarily synchronized.

However, this by no means implies that all participants perceive the situation – upon which their attention is focused by the adverbial modifier – in an identical manner. For into every situation, the participants‘ respective and distinct individual states of mind inevitably enter. This synchronized situatedness constitutes, in fact, a dynamic intertwining of mutual alterity. This implies, for instance, that the urgency, the compelling nature, or the necessity of a decision within a situation marked by the word „now“ may be assessed quite differently by the various participants in a conversation. Such differences in subjective disposition bear upon, for example, one’s readiness to act: the time of rest for the lark is the time of activity for the owl.

The individual differences in the assessment and evaluation of a situation marked by the word „now“ illustrate that temporal specification generates a relational arc of tension between the participants and the events involved – one that is simultaneously meaning-generating and challenging. It provokes a stance, may imply or explicitly demand options for action, and, where appropriate, motivates action itself. In this process, the simultaneity of synchronized events is not a comprehensive container in which those events are merely held; rather, as Jochen Gimmel observes, it is „stretched out“ through „the act of relating to the alterity of that which is temporally other.“

While the adverbial modifier „now“ can only ever be applied in relation to concrete situations, its nominalization introduces a generalization that is no longer tied to a specific situation, but instead denotes the general form of situations in which the adverbial modifier is employed. Whereas „now“ marks that which is singular and unique, „Now“ stands for a multiplicity of potential uses of „now.“ Hence the talk of many different „now-points,“ which – much like the oft-cited pearls on a string – can be strung together. The nominalized form „the Now“ has not gained lasting traction in everyday usage, nor has it found significant resonance there. It is employed primarily in theoretical discussions of time; in this context, it functions as a canonized neologism (typically attributed to Aristotle). Furthermore, it is generally deployed only in specific contexts – and with a certain generalizing or universalizing intent – such as in poetic language (Schiller: „swift as an arrow, the now has flown away“) or in the context of precepts for living a good life („Live in the Now“).

The reifying generalization of the originally adverbial relational determination leads one to misunderstand time as something „existent“ – as a concrete entity – or as something possessing the status of „Being.“ Once conceived as a quasi-autonomous entity, accidental properties can then easily – and perhaps even rashly – be ascribed to the „Now.“ The attempt to situate it within a linear timeline only serves to reinforce this tendency. The fleeting nature of the adverbial determination comes into conflict with the permanence inherent in the formal meaning of its nominalized expression – a contradiction that generally plagues discussions regarding the concept of time: the singularity of chronological time stands in opposition to the repetitive character of calendar time. The point here is not to deny the nominalized form of „now“ a certain cognitive value (specifically, its function as a general linguistic form for concretely designating a current situational context via the adverb „now“). Nevertheless, this ontologically prefigured mode of expression comes at the expense of the linguistically reflexive relational and ordering functions required within concrete contexts.

Wilhelm Köller (in “Die Zeit im Spiegel der Sprache”, p. 116) has proposed that abstract nouns such as „time“ – or indeed the „Now“ – be understood as a type of pronoun: that is, as a kind of placeholder or filler word capable of representing a wide variety of conceptual notions or histories of objectification. Accordingly, and in the spirit of Ernesto Laclau, one might speak of an „empty signifier“ – a term which, even in the absence of a clear intrinsic meaning, can serve as a kind of lowest common denominator for theoretical discussions concerning time. Whereas the logic of the adverbial determination „now“ serves to delimit and fix the meaning of a specific, concrete situational context, the logic of nominalization attempts to force various instances of the adverb’s usage into a single conceptual mold – thereby losing its connection to the concrete reality it originally designated.

The linguistic objectification of „Now“ as a general concept refers to the linguistic form of expression for the subjective fixation of concrete, interrelated processes of the world-processes that are also bound up with intersubjective processes of recognition: The adverb „now“ possesses a social dimension as well, which tends to be lost from view through its nominalization.

Literature:

Friedrich Schiller, Sprüche des Konfuzius (1795)
Jochen Gimmel, Zeit haben – Zeit sein. Ein Plädoyer für Zeit (2023), S. 26 f.
Wilhelm Köller, Die Zeit im Spiegel der Sprache. Untersuchungen zu den Objektivierungsformen für Zeit in der natürlichen Sprache (2019), S. 116

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